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Abstract
In this paper we examine the "some + n" construction, where the apparent quantifier "some" is used with a
numerical expression, as in "some 27 students were arrested." Contrary to previous claims in the literature, we
show that while many speakers prefer an approximative interpretation for some + n, it is untenable to analyze
“some" as an approximator akin to "about" or "roughly." We survey some constraints on the distribution of
some + n, and propose a semantic analysis based on recent theories of indefinite determiners (e.g. Alonso-
Ovalle and Menendez-Benito 2010) which is able to explain these constraints. On our account, "some"
introduces a manipulation of the domain of quantification, either restricting it to contextually relevant
pluralities or widening it to include pluralities whose cardinality is *approximately* that of the associated
numeral. In contexts where approximation is disfavored and there is no obvious restriction on the domain, the
meaning contribution of "some" is essentially vacuous. We claim that this vacuousness, in conjunction with
Horn's (1984) division of pragmatic labor, explains why some + n is most felicitous in emphatic contexts, e.g.,
"some 17 Republicans ran in the primary!" (where 17 is higher than expected) as opposed to "?Some 5
Democrats ran in the primary" (where 4 is average).
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1 Introduction
We examine the use of the quantifier some with a numeral, a construction which we call some + n,
exemplified by the newspaper headline in (1).
(1) Some 27 arrests in one morning in anti-Mafia blitz
(The Italian Insider, 12 January 2016)
Previous authors have attributed an approximative meaning to the some + n construction (Sauerland
and Stateva 2007, Anderson 2014), such that (2a) is taken to have roughly the same meaning as (2b).
(2) a. There were some twenty people at the party.
b. There were about twenty people at the party.
This has been captured via analyses that assign some a lexical entry comparable to that of an approx-
imator, such as about. Sauerland and Stateva (2007) implement this using the mechanism of scale
granularity, analyzing some + n as denoting n at the coarsest level of granularity (3). Somewhat
similarly, Anderson (2014) draws on Lasersohn’s (1999) notion of pragmatic halos, proposing that
some + n denotes a value in the set formed as the union of n and its halo (4):
(3) Jsome twentyKgran = coarsest(gran)(JtwentyK)
(4) Jsome twentyKc = f (JtwentyK∪haloc(JtwentyK))
We first argue that, while an approximative reading of some + n is possible for many speakers, it is a
mistake to treat some + n as an approximator, strictly speaking, and it is untenable to treat it as iden-
tical to about + n. We then note a particular emphatic effect that arises from the non-approximative
use of some + n. We give a semantic analysis that is in line with more general work on quantification
and indefinites (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito 2010, 2011),
whereby some + n introduces existential quantification over a restricted domain of pluralities with
numerosity (close to) n. Finally, we sketch out a pragmatic model of how our proposed denotation
of some + n leads to the emphatic effects associated with the construction.
1.1 Some + n Is Not (Always) an Approximator
If one reads the article for which (1) is the headline, it is clear that no approximative interpretation
is intended—exactly 27 relevant arrests in total were made in two separate raids that morning. This
is not unusual. Numerous examples of some + n in contexts that suggest precision can be found in
the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2008-), including the following.
(5) Some 1,841 retirees pulled down more than $100,000 a year in pension checks.
(6) Of some 206 students who responded to the survey, 52% were female.
Nothing in these examples, or in the contexts in which they appear, suggests a meaning similar to
about + n.
That said, not all speakers agree on this. Anecdotally, intuitions among native speakers con-
flict about the felicity of the above examples, with some speakers showing a strong preference for
about-like uses as in (2). Experimentally, Solt et al. (2017) use a numerical range task on examples
like (1) and (2) to show that indeed there is a mixture of: (i) speakers who prefer approximative
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interpretations of some + n across the board, (ii) speakers who prefer approximative interpretations
of some + n only when it is used with round numbers (ten, twenty, etc.), and (iii) speakers who tend
to always interpret some + n as being precise.
We aim to give a semantic analysis of this construction that partially explains its variation in
meaning. We do so by positing a representation that contains an underspecified domain restriction
function (Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito 2010) which can easily be, but need not be, enriched
with an approximating function. Before spelling that out, let’s examine other, more fundamental
ways in which some + n differs from about + n, before turning to the pragmatic effects of using
some + n in non-approximating contexts.
1.2 Some + n Has a More Constrained Distribution Than About + n
Unlike about + n and other approximators, like roughly and approximately, some + n can only occur
in contexts where the associated numeric phrase can be interpreted as a plural individual; that is, as
the concatenation or sum of some number of atomic individuals.
(7) The meeting lasted (about/some) three hours.
(8) The tree is (about/some) twenty feet from the house.
(9) The meeting took place at (about/*some) three o’clock.
(10) The tree was planted in (about/*some) 1989.
In (7), the phrase three hours can be interpreted as the sum of three 60-minute intervals, and
some + n is perfectly acceptable. Similarly, twenty feet in (8) can be understood as a spatial extent
formed as the concatenation of twenty 1-foot extents, again allowing some. In (9), on the other hand,
the phrase three o’clock cannot be so interpreted—it makes no sense to speak of three individual
“o’clocks” being summed together—and in that case, some + n is illegal. A similar point can be
made about (10). This contrasts with about + n, which is licensed in all of these contexts.
An analysis of 500 some + n tokens extracted from COCA found that cardinality-based mea-
sures such as some twenty students were the most common (61% of tokens). After these, temporal
and spatial extents (corresponding to (7) and (8), respectively) were the next most frequent. Also
occurring were expressions corresponding to other additive measures, including land area, volume
and proportion. Punctual temporal expressions as in (9) and (10) were unattested, however, in either
this or a larger sample.
These data show that, while about + n instantiates pure approximation of a numeral or other
measure expression, some + n is constrained by the semantic type of the denotation of the measure
phrase in which the numeral occurs.
Moreover, some + n lacks a true degree interpretation. In other words, some + n cannot by
itself, with no associated noun phrase, refer to a number or numerical range. This is demonstrated
by its infelicity in mathematical statements and as the answer to a how many question. Again, this
is contra the behavior of about + n and other similar constructions.
(11) Seven times fourteen is (about/roughly/approximately/*some) one hundred.
(12) Q: How many students passed the test?
A: (About/roughly/approximately/??some) fifty
But note that the degraded status of some + n in (12) is ameliorated if a pronoun is present (e.g.,
some fifty of them).
Taken together, examples (7)–(12) suggest that some + n is the result of combining some with
a numeral phrase that can be interpreted as a plurality of entities of some sort. This, along with
the propensity of many speakers to assign an approximative interpretation, especially with round
numbers, will be the basis for our semantic analysis of this construction. We end our introduction
by discussing an interesting pragmatic effect of non-approximative some + n.
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1.3 Some + n Gives Rise to Emphasis
In cases where some + n does not give rise to an approximative reading, what is its function? It is
clear that some + n is not identical to a bare numeral in such cases. Imagine the following sentences,
each uttered in an out-of-the-blue context.
(13) a. I raised two children.
b. ?? I raised some two children.
It is pragmatically odd to utter (13b) (which is surely not meant to approximate) when (13a) would
have sufficed to convey the exact same meaning. But we know from examples like (1), (5), and (6)
that non-approximative some + n can be perfectly natural in some contexts. Such contexts, we argue,
are ones in which the numeral phrase can be interpreted emphatically. That is, the speaker wishes
to draw attention to the numeral phrase, inasmuch as she finds the numerosity to be noteworthy or
surprising in some way. The following minimal pair illustrates the difference in felicity between
some + n in ordinary and emphatic contexts.
(14) a. ? Some five Democrats ran in the 2016 Presidential primary.
b. Some seventeen Republicans ran in the 2016 Presidential primary!
The emphatic (14b) is a much more natural utterance, all things being equal, than (14a). The effect
seems to be that in (14b), some + n is being used to highlight the number of Republican candidates,
which is unusually large by modern historical standards. In (14a), on the other hand, the number of
Democratic candidates is much more in line with what one would expect, and thus use of some + n
seems unjustified.
In Section 3 we will show how the semantic analysis we give in the following section, which
is used to derive the facts in the previous sections, can give rise to emphasis by making vacuous
contributions that take on additional emphatic meaning via Horn’s (1984) division of pragmatic
labor.
2 Semantic Analysis
The data discussed in Section 1.2 suggest strongly that some + n does not have a denotation in the
domain of degrees, but that, instead, some operates on individuals of some sort. Taking a broader
perspective, this should not come as any surprise: in its more common instantiation, some is an
indefinite determiner, which is most commonly analyzed as introducing existential quantification
over individuals. The core idea that we pursue here is that the some of some + n is in fact no
different from ‘ordinary’ quantificational some. That is, the claim is that all of the examples in (15)
are based on the same lexical entry for some:1
(15) a. Some student was arrested.
b. Some students were arrested.
c. Some twenty students were arrested.
More specifically, we draw on proposals from the literature on indefinites, according to which
certain indefinite determiners are existential quantifiers that also introduce an operation or restric-
tion on the domain of quantification. It is well known that quantification in natural language is made
over contextually restricted domains. To say for example that everyone had a good time is not to
make a claim about everyone in the entire universe, but rather to make a claim about some contex-
tually specified set of individuals; say, those who attended a particular party. It has been argued that
certain quantificational determiners encode the manipulation of the domain as part of their lexical
semantics. Perhaps most famously, Kadmon and Landman (1993) propose that any is a domain
widener, and Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) make a somewhat similar claim for German irgendein
‘some’. Conversely, other indefinite determiners been proposed to restrict the domain of quantifi-
cation (similarly to the case of everyone discussed above) via a subset function that maps the entire
1Farkas (2002) makes a similar claim, but attributes to some + n an inherently approximative meaning.
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domain to some contextually relevant subset thereof. Such is the analysis given by Alonso-Ovalle
and Mene´ndez-Benito (2010) to Spanish un ‘a’ and (with some further content) algu´n ‘some’.
Building in particular on this latter work, we propose the following as the basic lexical entry for
some, where f is a function from sets of individuals to sets of individuals:
(16) JsomeK= λPλQ.∃x[ f (P)(x)∧Q(x)]
Below we will consider in more depth the nature of the function f, which we will argue is the locus of
the interspeaker variation in the availability of the approximative interpretation, among other effects.
First, however, let us see how this entry allows a compositional analysis of some + n, and how it
accounts for the restrictions on its distribution.
To start, we follow authors including Krifka (1999) and Landman (2004) in assuming a non-
quantificational semantics for numerically quantified noun phrases. Cardinal numerals themselves
denote cardinality predicates; that is, predicates over plural individuals that specify their number of
atomic parts, per (17a). These may compose intersectively with a plural noun phrase, forming a
complex predicate, as in (17b).
(17) a. JtwentyK= λxe.|x|= 
b. Jtwenty studentsK= JtwentyK∩ JstudentsK= λxe.students(x)∧|x|= 
In the absence of an overt determiner, a nominal expression of the form in (17b) composes via set
intersection with the sentential predicate, with quantificational force arising via existential closure,
yielding the following for a simple example:
(18) Twenty students were arrested.
∃x[students(x)∧|x|= 20∧arrested(x)]
Returning to some + n, the set expression in (17b) is also of the right semantic type to saturate
the first argument slot of some. We thus derive (19) for some twenty students, and (20) for a full
sentential example:
(19) Jsome twenty studentsK= JsomeK(Jtwenty studentsK)
= λQ.∃x[ f (Jtwenty studentsK)(x)∧Q(x)]
= λQ.∃x[ f (λy.students(y)∧|y|= 20)(x)∧Q(x)]
(20) Some twenty students were arrested
∃x[ f (λy.students(y)∧|y|= 20)(x)∧arrested(x)]
In words, (20) says that in the set obtained by applying the function f to the set of twenty-member
pluralities of students, there is a plurality of individuals who were arrested.
Recall from Section 1.2 that some + n is infelicitous in contexts in which a numerical expression
is interpreted as referring to a numerical value or range; this includes mathematical statements as
well as answers to how many questions (see (11)-(12)). This restriction falls out from the present
analysis. Some + n does not denote a degree; in fact, it is not a constituent at all. Thus it cannot
occur in positions that involve reference to degrees. This contrasts with about + n, which plausibly
has a purely degree-based denotation along the lines of (3) or (4) (see Sauerland and Stateva 2007
and Solt 2014 for specific proposals regarding the semantics of approximators such as about).
The present account also provides a route to explaining the constraints on the sort of measure
phrases that may occur in some + n. On the present analysis, some takes sets of entities as arguments,
and more specifically introduces a function from sets to sets, which we have characterized as a
manipulation of its domain of quantification. In the cardinality-based example worked out above,
the sets in question were sets of ordinary plural individuals; that is, of type 〈e, t〉. Certain measure
expressions, such as those exemplified in (7) and (8) above, can also be analyzed as denoting sets,
albeit of a different sort of plural entity. Durations, in particular, can be conceptualized as temporal
extents; that is, as convex intervals on the timeline (Krifka 1989). An expression such as three hours
can then be analyzed as denoting the set of such intervals that have a length of three hours; that is,
that are equivalent to the concatenation of three 1-hour intervals. A corresponding analysis can be
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given to spatial extents, which in Vector Space Semantics (Zwarts 1997, Zwarts and Winter 2000)
are analyzed as vectors; that is, as directed line segments between points in space. Thus twenty feet
denotes the set of vectors of length twenty feet, while twenty feet from the house denotes the subset
of that set whose origin is the house.
(21) Jthree hoursK= {t : convex(t)∧hours(t) = 3}
(22) Jtwenty feetK= {v : |v|= 20′}
Expressions such as these are of the right general sort to serve as arguments of some. In semi-formal
terms, our earlier example (8) receives the analysis in (23), which like the previous cardinality-based
example features a domain-manipulation function f and an existential quantifier.2
(23) The tree is some twenty feet from the house.
∃v[v ∈ f ({v : |v|= 20′})∧ v originates at the house∧ v terminates at the tree]
By contrast, punctual temporal measures such as three o’clock or 1989 cannot be construed as
individuals that can be members of sets. Rather, expressions such as three o’clock and 1989 are
better understood as rigidly designating specific points or segments of the timeline. In that these
expressions do not have set-based interpretations, they do not provide an appropriate argument for
some. This explains the ungrammaticality of examples such as *some three o’clock or *some 1989.
Let us now return to a crucial component of our proposed semantics for some, namely the
domain-manipulation function f. We claim that the nature of this function is crucial to the pragmatic
effects that obtain with some + n, as well as the interspeaker variation in the interpretation that this
construction allows. In Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito’s analysis of Spanish un and algu´n
that served as the starting point for our analysis of some, the domain of quantification introduced
by the indefinite determiner is a subset of the total domain. For example, un estudiante ‘a student’
introduces existential quantification over some subset of the set of all students in the universe. This
captures the intuition that indefinite determiners semantically encode domain restriction of the sort
involved covertly in universally quantified examples such as everyone had a good time, discussed
above. Adopting Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito’s analysis, we propose that in the default
case, the domain-manipulation function f lexicalized by some is likewise a subset function, which
maps a set to a subset of it.
In the case of some + n, however, we propose that speakers differ in the value that they assign
to this function. Specifically, for those speakers who attribute an approximative meaning to some
+ n, the function f does not narrow the domain of quantification, but instead widens it to include
pluralities close in cardinality to n. The two possible interpretations of f are thus the following:
(24) a. Default some: f (Jtwenty studentsK)⊆ Jtwenty studentsK
b. Approximating some: f (Jtwenty studentsK) = λx.students(x)∧|x| ≈ 20
That some should sometimes induce a sort of widening of the domain of quantification is not unex-
pected in the context of the cross-linguistic landscape of indefinite determiners, some of which are
known to have a domain-widening function (e.g. German irgendein, discussed above). We moreover
believe there to be solid pragmatic reasons for the interpretation in (24a) to be reanalyzed along the
lines of (24b). Assuming that f is interpreted simply as a subset function, a sentence such as some
twenty students were arrested is from the perspective of the hearer truth conditionally indistinguish-
able from its simpler counterpart twenty students were arrested: since the hearer does not know
which subset function the speaker has in mind, existential quantification over f (Jtwenty studentsK)
is not distinguishable from existential quantification over the full domain Jtwenty studentsK. This
plausibly has lead to a pressure to attribute additional semantic content to the some variant.
2The reader might note that the lexical entry for some in (16) is not precisely what we need to derive the
interpretation in (23) compositionally. This might be dealt with by incorporating type flexibility into the se-
mantics of some, or alternately by pursuing a decompositional approach according to which the lexical content
of some is only the domain-manipulation function f, with existential quantification arising via existential clo-
sure. Selecting between these and other options would require a more in-depth investigation of the semantics
of measurement than is possible in the present paper; however, we believe that such an extension is feasible.
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Recall that the experimental investigation of Solt et al. (2017) found that some speakers attribute
an approximative interpretation to some + n only in combination with round numbers (e.g. some
twenty) while others interpret the construction approximatively across the board. Krifka (2007)
points out that bare round numerals themselves allow an approximate interpretation, while bare
non-round numbers must be interpreted precisely. We hypothesize that for the first group of speakers
(round only approximate), some + n is interpreted as maximally domain widening with respect to
the numerical value, such that n is interpreted in the broadest possible way compatible with its
semantics; this yields an approximate reading for round numbers, but a precise interpretation for
non-round ones. For the second group of speakers (across the board approximate), we propose that
the approximating function has been further conventionalized in the semantics of some, which may
then add an approximative meaning to the interpretation of the numeral.
To summarize, an analysis of some + n couched in the tradition of recent theories of indefinite
determiners provides a means to account for the construction’s similarity in meaning to unmodi-
fied numerical expressions, as well as the availability of an approximative interpretation for some
speakers.
In concluding this section, we briefly consider other semantic effects found with some, and
how they relate to the analysis developed here. Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito (2010, 2011)
observe that algu´n, the Spanish counterpart of some, produces an ignorance effect when it composes
with a singular noun phrase, but not when it composes with a plural nominal. They account for this
by proposing that algu´n requires that its (restricted) domain of quantification be a non-singleton set.
In the singular case the ignorance effect can then be derived as an implicature relative to singleton-
set alternatives that the speaker could have used; this implicature is blocked in the plural case.
English some shows a similar pattern of ignorance effects with singular and plural noun phrases. For
example, some student was arrested suggests that the speaker does not know (or care) which student
it was, while this effect is absent in the plural some students were arrested. On this basis, we might
similarly propose that the output of the domain-manipulation function lexicalized by some likewise
must be a non-singleton set. However, an account along the lines of Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-
Benito’s would also predict an ignorance effect for some + n. This prediction is not borne out: some
twenty students were arrested does not convey speaker ignorance as to which twenty students were
arrested, though it may suggest that their number is more important than their identity.
These data suggest that a somewhat different account of variable ignorance effects with some is
needed. We hypothesize that the solution to this puzzle may lie in redefining what it means to be a
non-singleton set; exploring this in depth is, however, beyond the scope of this paper, and must be
left for future work.
3 Deriving Emphasis
The semantic analysis above predicts that in certain contexts in which some + n is not interpretable
as denoting approximation, the truth-conditional contribution of some + n beyond that of a bare
numeral is completely vacuous. Let’s take (13b) as a starting point, reprinted below as (25).
(25) ?? I raised some two children.
Let’s assume two points: (i) the speaker in (25) knows how many children he or she raised, and
(ii) there is no contextually obvious restriction on the set of two-child pluralities in this case. These
assumptions entail that there is no obvious candidate for the output of the f function in the denotation
of some + n, apart from the entire domain of two-child pluralities. That is to say, the hearer is forced
to interpret f as if it were the identity function, and as a result, we obtain the same denotation for
(25) as we would have using the simpler bare numeral phrase, two children.
JI raised some two childrenK = ∃x[ f (λy.[children(y) ∧ |y|= 2])(x) ∧ raised(speaker)(x)]
= ∃x[λy.[children(y) ∧ |y|= 2](x) ∧ raised(speaker)(x)]
(if f is interpreted as if it were the identity function)
= ∃x[children(x) ∧ |x|= 2 ∧ raised(speaker)(x)]
= JI raised two childrenK
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The contribution of some in this context is completely vacuous. It is a short step from vacuousness
to emphasis, as the following examples illustrate.
(26) a. No fewer than seventeen Republicans ran in the 2016 Presidential primary.
b. Not ten, not fifteen, but seventeen Republicans ran in the 2016 Presidential primary.
c. Fully seventeen Republicans ran in the 2016 Presidential primary.
In all of these cases, the numeric phrase is embedded within a construction (no fewer than n, not n
but n′ (where n < n′) or fully n) that is either entailed by or strongly implicated by the denotation
of the corresponding bare numeral phrase. There is effectively no semantic contribution made by
these constructions, and yet they can be perfectly natural, and not at all redundant, precisely in those
contexts that favor (14b), reprinted below as (27).
(27) Some seventeen Republicans ran in the 2016 Presidential primary!
The constructions in (26) all have two things in common with some + n: (i) their truth-conditional
contributions in context are slim to none, and (ii) they are felicitous as expressions of emphasis.
Another construction that is even more similar to some + n in that it not only has an emphatic effect
but can be used for approximation, is the discourse particle like (Beltrama and Hanink to appear).
(28) a. There were like, seventeen Republicans in the 2016 Presidential primary.
b. There were like fifteen Republicans in the 2016 Presidential primary.
When followed by a prosodic pause as in (28a), like carries a meaning of surprise, whereas in (28b)
it is most naturally interpreted as an approximator. The generality of this phenomenon suggests a
very general explanation. We propose the facts can be explained, at least in part, by applying Horn’s
(1984) division of pragmatic labor, paraphrased below.
(29) Division of pragmatic labor: Marked forms signal marked meanings.
This was proposed as a principle to explain implicatures arising from what Grice called Manner
violations, where lengthy or otherwise convoluted expressions give rise to alternative meanings.
(30) a. Lee stopped the car.
b. Lee made the car stop.
In (30a), the unaccusative stop being used with an agent Lee gives rise to what one might construe
as the default interpretation for cause(Lee)(stop(car)), namely that Lee pressed the brake pedal,
causing the car to come to a stop. But in (30b), the explicit causative construction, made stop, which
is a marked way of conveying λx. cause(x)(stop(car)), gives rise to the unusual interpretation that
Lee caused the car to stop via some other means, perhaps by standing in the path of the moving car
until the driver stopped, or by crashing the car into a road sign.
Van Rooy (2004), expanding on the work of Parikh (2001), provides a mathematical analysis
of why the division of pragmatic labor should hold generally within and across languages. The
details of that account, which involves evolutionary game theory, cannot be explicated here, but in
the remainder of this section we present a simple algebraic model that captures the spirit of that
analysis and applies it to the use of some + n (or other forms like in (26)).
The key notion to modeling the division of pragmatic labor is utility. One can think of the
utility of an utterance as its payoff—by definition, interlocutors strive to maximize the utility of
their conversational contributions. In game theory and related frameworks like decision theory,
utility is usually a function from (sets of) choices—such as which forms to use to convey which
meanings—to real numbers. However, we do not need any specific numbers in our model. We can
instead represent utility values purely algebraically. But first let’s define some additional terms.
Utility-based models often encode Grice’s Maxim of Quantity by giving higher utility to utter-
ances that carry more information (see e.g. Frank and Goodman 2012, Franke and Ja¨ger 2016). To
this end, we take the utility of an utterance to be equal to the surprisal of the utterance, minus the
cost of the utterance. Surprisal of utterance u is equal to −log Prob(JuK), where Prob(JuK) is the
prior probability of u being true. Thus, the more surprising u is (i.e. the less likely one is to believe
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JuK before hearing u), the higher is the utility assigned to u. Again, we do not need specific values
for the quantities in this model, and thus other measures of information content may also work.
In being emphatic, the speaker is signaling that the surprisal of u is higher than the hearer might
have expected a priori. For simplicity we will only consider two possible surprisal values: a baseline
surprisal value, which we will label σ , and an higher surprisal value associated with an emphatic
interpretation, which we will label σ +∆, where ∆ is the change in surprisal from a normal to an
emphatic context.
The cost of an utterance is taken to be an encoding of how complex it is, either semantically or
phonetically. We compare a single simple form (a bare numeral phrase) against a single complex
form (some + n). For our purposes, it does not matter which measure of complexity we choose,
because some + n, when compared to a bare numeral, is phonetically longer and also, if our hypoth-
esis is correct, has a more complex semantic representation. For simplicity we can assume that the
simple form is costless, and assign the complex form a fixed positive cost, which we will label c.
The speaker’s goal in this model is to signal that the information being conveyed by her ut-
terance has higher-than-baseline surprisal. We refer to contexts in which surprisal is higher than
baseline as emphatic contexts (EMPH for short), and the other contexts as baseline contexts (BASE
for short). The hearer does not know a priori which kind of context she is in. If she correctly deter-
mines that she is in an EMPH context, the utility for the speaker is σ +∆, whereas if she determines
that she is in a BASE context, the utility for the speaker is only σ .
We now want to compare three different logically possible systems for marking emphasis:
1. Complex marker (CM): The complex form marks EMPH, and the simple form marks BASE
(complies with Horn’s division of pragmatic labor).
2. Simple marker (SM): The simple form marks EMPH, and the complex form marks BASE (the
“anti-Horn” strategy).
3. No marker (NM): Emphasis is not marked.
Our chosen measure of how efficient a system is for maximizing utility in the aggregate is the
expected utility of using that system. The expected utility (EU) of one of the above systems is the
average utility of successfully employing that system, weighted by how often emphatic contexts
arise, which we will label PEMPH, and how often baseline contexts arise, PBASE, which is 1−PEMPH.
For the CM system, expected utility is the product of PEMPH and σ +∆− c (the utility of using a
complex form to signal emphasis), plus the product of PBASE and σ (the utility of using a simple
form to signal a baseline context). For the SM system, expected utility is the product of PEMPH and
σ +∆ (the utility of using a simple form to signal emphasis), plus the product of PBASE and σ − c
(the utility of using a complex form to signal a baseline context). Expected utility for not signaling
emphasis is simply σ .
EU(CM) = PEMPH(σ +∆ − c)+PBASEσ
EU(SM) = PEMPH(σ +∆)+PBASE(σ − c)
EU(NM) = σ
Armed with high school algebra, we can calculate the conditions under which the observed CM
system (the system that employs Horn’s division of pragmatic labor) is the best of the three. We do
this by solving two inequalities: EU(CM) > EU(SM) and EU(CM) > EU(NM). The solutions are
given below.
EU(CM) > EU(SM)
PEMPH(σ +∆ − c)+PBASEσ > PEMPH(σ +∆)+PBASE(σ − c)
⇓
PEMPH < 
EU(CM) > EU(NM)
PEMPH(σ +∆ − c)+PBASEσ > σ
PEMPH(∆ − c) > 0
⇓
PEMPH >  and ∆> c
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The conditions that arise from these inequalities can be summarized as follows: (i) emphatic contexts
must occur less frequently than baseline contexts, (ii) emphatic contexts must nonetheless occur, and
(iii) the boost in utility associated with emphasis must outweigh the cost of using a complex form.
So, if emphasis is not too common,3 and if talk remains cheap, it is best to employ CM.
4 Conclusion
We have showed that in many instances, contra previous literature, some + n is not an approximating
construction. In doing so, we have noted some constraints on the semantic type of the measure
expression contained within the some + n phrase, which are consistent with an account where some
+ n is the simple composition of some with a numeral phrase. We assume a semantics for some that
involves existential quantification over a restricted domain derived via an underspecified function
from sets to sets, f . Under this proposal an approximative interpretation can arise via filling the f
function variable with a function that approximates. In cases where no approximative interpretation
is possible, and in which the restriction on the domain is not obvious to the hearer, we argue that use
of some + n is semantically indistinguishable (at least for the hearer) from the equivalent sentence
with a bare numeral phrase. This explains why the use of some + n in these contexts can have the
pragmatic effect of emphasizing the cardinality of the plurality associated with the numeral phrase,
insofar as Horn’s division of pragmatic labor predicts such uses. Finally, we developed a simple
algebraic model to show that the division of pragmatic labor is communicatively more effective than
both an “anti-Horn” system and a system that does not mark emphasis at all, namely, because it
allows the speaker to convey when an utterance is more surprising or interesting than the hearer
might have otherwise thought, and to do so with the least amount of effort on average.
Future work will further connect the semantics of some + n with the semantics of indefinites
and quantifiers more generally. One avenue of exploration is the lack of ignorance effects with some
+ n, discussed in Section 2 above. Finally, we hope to further explore the interspeaker variation with
respect to the approximative effect of some + n, and to look for any relevant diachronic trends. We
note that an analysis of tokens from the Corpus of Historical American English (Davies 2010-) shows
the rate of occurrence of some + n with overt markers of approximation has steadily decreased since
the 19th century. This suggests, perhaps, that approximative use of some + n (which would preclude
the necessity of a co-occurring approximator) is an innovation, perhaps a conventionalization of
variation in how the domain of quantification is determined.
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